KILLING QASEM SOLEIMANI

International Lawyers Divided and Conquered

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1 Introduction

In an influential piece published by the American Journal of International Law in 1908, Oppenheim opined that the chief task for the science of international law was “the exposition of the existing recognized rules.” He further explained that “[w]hatever we think of the value of a recognized rule – whether we approve or condemn it, whether we want to retain, abolish, or replace it – we must first of all know whether it is really a recognized rule of law at all, and what are its commands.” Writing in that same journal 75 years later, Weil strictly distinguished between the prelegal and the legal, and noted that “on one side of the line, there is born a legal obligation that can be relied on before a court or arbitrator, the flouting of which constitutes an internationally unlawful act giving rise to international responsibility; on the other side, there is nothing of the kind.”

Then, in 2001, the International Law Commission (ILC) released its (Draft) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) with a truism at its core: “Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.” That wrongfulness flows from an act (or omission) that is attributable to the State and constitutes a breach of its international obligations. The latter can evidently be ascertained by “comparing the conduct in fact engaged in by the State with the conduct legally prescribed by the international obligation.”

The point of these fundamental observations is that (one of) international lawyers’ primary task(s) is to determine with precision whether contentious State conduct is or is not in accordance with the edicts of international law and, consequently, does or does not entail international responsibility. This simple idea has a long and distinguished pedigree. For example, already in the 19th century British uomo universale William Whewell set out to

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3 Id., at 315.
6 Id., at 55.
“contribute to the formation of a strong body of experts on International Law, distributed among the chief countries of the world”, such that “every nation would be willing, if not to accept the general verdict of such experts, at least to hesitate to impute malignity to another nation whose conduct was declared by the common opinion of experts in neutral countries to be technically correct”.  

The point of this article, however, is to argue that such an undertaking has currently and decidedly taken a back seat in the international legal academy, given what Jan Klabbers has labelled the “fragmentation of international lawyers” as opposed (or in addition) to that of international law. While the article is certainly inspired by the appreciation that such a status quo is indeed a sorry one, it will limit itself to evidencing that understanding through a single yet revealing case study: the legality vel non of killing Iranian Major-General Qasem Soleimani by U.S. drone strikes, and the staggering lack of agreement on international law’s substance and application in that case by some of the world’s leading experts.

The article is structured in two main parts. First, it sets out the facts surrounding the death of Soleimani as they have been widely reported by media outlets and relied upon by international legal experts. It then delves into the analysis by no less than fifteen of them who (co-)authored eleven legal briefs of varying depth. All such briefs tackle, to a more or lesser extent, the same overarching question: Was the killing of Soleimani by U.S. drone strikes in conformity with the relevant requirements of international law, consisting of the jus ad bellum (JAB), jus in bello (JIB) and international human rights law (IHRL)?

However, as noted above, there was little consensus among the experts – if any. The article hopes to better understand why international lawyers disagree so spectacularly by comparing and contrasting the variety of views in the Soleimani-case, and stripping down the supporting argumentation to uncover the underlying (theoretical and methodological) approach. That preliminary examination will be tackled in the article’s second part. The root of the problem indeed appears to lie in a different methodological approach to the same issue, which includes relying on different sources and/or interpreting the same sources differently. Add to that the law’s supposed indeterminacy, the absence of an authoritative arbiter, and contemporary academic idiosyncrasies, and it becomes clear(er) why each interpretation of international law is seemingly allowed to stand.

The article ends with some final reflections. Generally, it hopes to spark a much-needed debate by identifying a worrying trend in international law and taking a swing at offering preliminary explanations, rather than present a definitive solution. After all, if the “invisible college of international lawyers” cannot decide on the disputed legality of a State unapologetically taking out the military brass of its arch-enemy on the territory of a neutral country, it is difficult to see what remains of the prohibition on the use of force – the cornerstone of the Charter of the United Nations and international law more broadly.

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2 Case study: The killing of Qasem Soleimani

2.1 Facts and context

On Friday 3 January 2020 at 12:47 AM local time, American MQ-9 Reaper drones struck a convoy leaving Baghdad International Airport in Iraq, killing ten individuals. Among the dead was Iranian Major-General Qasem Soleimani, chief of the Quds Force and one of the most powerful men in Iran, as well as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, de facto leader of the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces and founder of the Kataib Hezbollah (KH) militia. Five days later, Iran responded with missile attacks on the Ain Al Asad air base, used by American forces to train Iraqi soldiers, causing traumatic brain injury to more than 100 U.S. servicemen. Just hours after that, the Iranian military – on high alert for American counteractions – accidentally shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane on its way to Kyiv from Tehran, killing all 176 on board.

Rising tensions between the United States and Iran over the previous two years culminated in that deadly week in early January. These tensions started with the U.S. withdrawal on 8 May 2018 from the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran and its policy of maximum pressure ever since. They included several incidents in 2019, allegedly caused by one of the protagonists, such as damaging oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman, shooting down an American drone near the Strait of Hormuz, disabling Iranian tracking equipment through cyber-operations, and destroying Saudi Arabian energy infrastructure sites.

The temperature rose even further in December 2019. First, Iran-allied forces launched indirect fire attacks against Iraqi military facilities where U.S. troops were stationed. During one of those attacks on a base near Kirkuk on 27 December, a U.S. contractor was killed and several American and Iraqi soldiers wounded. The U.S. responded two days later by targeting five facilities in Iraq and Syria – used by Kataib Hezbollah, to which the attacks were attributed – killing 25 militia members and wounding 55 more. Finally, at the turn of the year, enraged militia supporters stormed and entered the U.S. embassy compound in Baghdad, setting fire to some of its buildings. These militia members withdrew on 1 January, leading U.S. President Donald Trump to tweet in his familiar bellicose style:

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The U.S. Embassy in Iraq is, & has been for hours, SAFE! Many of our great Warfighters, together with the most lethal military equipment in the world, was immediately rushed to the site. Thank you to the President & Prime Minister of Iraq for their rapid response upon request ... Iran will be held fully responsible for lives lost, or damage incurred, at any of our facilities. They will pay a very BIG PRICE! This is not a Warning, it is a Threat. Happy New Year!

As we now know, that threat was no mere bluster. In fact, the decision to opt for the most extreme military option and take out Soleimani would be made in the following hours.

2.2 A comparative overview of expert analysis

The growing antagonism between Iran and the United States provides the crucial context for a better understanding of the killing of General Soleimani – including, importantly, from a legal point of view. The following sections set out the analysis on the legality of the targeted drone strikes as carried out by fifteen experts.

On a preliminary note, an author’s position vis-à-vis a subsection of international law will not be taken into account unless (s)he has taken an explicit position on the lex lata in the Soleimani-case – as the law is, as opposed to the lex ferenda or the law as it ought to be –and expanded upon it in some depth. In addition, the expressed views will


For example, this excludes incidental commentary to news outlets or even the otherwise insightful debate between five renowned experts (Ashley Deeks, Jack Goldsmith, Samuel Moyn, Bobby Chesney and Scott Anderson) in a podcast-episode on the Lawfare-website (see: https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-special-edition-law-and-soleimani-strike). That discussion set out the relevant legal questions, but did not (attempt to) answer them nor tackle the finer points of the law in much detail. See also Gurmendi, supra.
be treated in isolation, meaning that an author's previous scholarship will not feature in the discussion below. That discussion proceeds thematically, setting out points of (dis)agreement between the experts on issues of the jus ad bellum (section 2.2.1) and jus in bello (section 2.2.2). Generally, seven out of fifteen experts carried out a comprehensive legal review of the military action (in three separate opinions).\textsuperscript{23} Four others focused primarily on JAB-issues, while two more zoomed in on the relationship between JIB and IHRL.\textsuperscript{22} The final two discussed the interplay between JIB and JAB, but concentrated on the former.\textsuperscript{25}

As for the most basic question – spoiler alert! – eleven commentators argued that the drone strikes (likely) violated one or more rules of international law, a conclusion with which only two explicitly disagreed.\textsuperscript{24} The final two experts under review chose not to engage with all legal questions, making it impossible to discern their position on the legality of the military action as a whole. Nevertheless, they did opine that Soleimani qualified as a legitimate military target.\textsuperscript{25}

### 2.2.1 Were the drone strikes in conformity with the jus ad bellum?

A first JAB-issue concerns the proactive US argument that it had “taken decisive defensive action … by killing Qasem Soleimani” because he was “plotting imminent and sinister attacks on American diplomats and military personnel.”\textsuperscript{26} That raises the question of legality concerning so-called pre-emptive self-defense against imminent armed attacks, understood as attacks that have not yet begun. This reveals a first schism between commentators.

On one side are the experts who consider that “the law does not permit the use of military force to respond to an alleged plan to attack in the future” and note that “no international court or tribunal has ever endorsed the argument.”\textsuperscript{27} On the other we find those who do not reject outright a more expansive interpretation in case the situation “necessitates immediate defensive action to successfully repel” an imminent attack, even if that attack is not (yet) “about to occur.”\textsuperscript{28} UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Agnes Callamard appears to occupy the middle ground by relying on the famous Caroline formulation, suggesting that “a State can

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\item note 19: “Yes. The American strike against Qasem Soleimani was illegal. This is the common conclusion of some of the world’s best experts on international law and jus ad bellum.” Given the comment’s brevity, and the fact that the three experts referred to (i.e., Milanovic (twice), Callamard and Haque) do not agree on each relevant issue, Gurmendi is not counted as one of the experts commenting on the jus ad bellum for the purposes of this article.
\item Corten, Lagerwalt, Koutroulis, Dubuisson, Talmon, Heipertz and Callamard.
\item Compare O’Connell, Milanovic, Haque and Labuda with Gurmendi and Janik.
\item Corn and Jenks.
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\item Corn and Jenks.
\item O’Connell, supra note 19; Corten & others, supra note 19, at 10–11.
\item Milanovic (Jan. 7), supra note 19; Corn and Jenks, supra note 19. Alternatively, Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 19, considered commentators had simply been “barking up the wrong tree,” since the imminence-argument was “something of a red herring.” See also: Masood Farivar & Ken Bredeheimer, US Attorney General Calls Imminence of Iranian Threat a Red Herring, Vox News (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iraq/us-attorney-general-calls-imminence-iranian-threat-red-herring.
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defend itself against a current, ongoing attack *as well as* an attack that is imminent, where the attack is ‘instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, no moment of deliberation.”29

However, all of the experts commenting on the jus ad bellum harbored doubts about whether the *facts* were sufficient to meet even the threshold set by a broad interpretation of the right to pre-emptive self-defense. As always, Milanovic eloquently hit that point home:

> The Soleimani strike is thus … *is imminently* unlawful. The lack of any specific details provided publicly and the disclosure of US intelligence that goes against US interests cast serious doubts on whether the various factual predicates for lawful self-defence could be met even on a generous appraisal of the facts. Similarly, the deterrence rationale for killing Soleimani, even if admissible in principle, collapses under the weight of its own failure, a failure that was easily foreseeable.30

A second JAB-issue relates to the *reactive* U.S. argument that it had undertaken military action not (only) to defend against future armed attacks, but rather “in response to an escalating series of armed attacks in recent months by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iran-supported militias on United States forces and interests in the Middle East region.”31 According to U.S. officials, this included several incidents in 2019: (1) the Iranian take-down of an American MQ-4 drone in June; (2) a threat to the U.S.S. Boxer posed by an Iranian drone in July, (3) multiple rocket attacks by the “Qods Force-backed” Kataib Hezbollah against Iraqi bases hosting US personnel in November, and (4) the aforementioned32 military exchanges on Iraqi (and Syrian) soil in December and (early) January 2020. Moreover, and still according to the U.S., this series of attacks took place in the context of other threats to international peace and security by Iran, including against Saudi Arabia (through its Yemeni proxies) and international commerce.33 Since this argument did not feature in the rapid response U.S. justifications, and no one is “entitled to ascribe to States legal views which they do not themselves formulate,”34 early commentators understandably did not address it.35

Those who did could again be divided in two camps. In the first we find Haque who indicated that “the last incident in this series was over when the U.S. decided to strike.” Accordingly, this “dooms the United States’ legal case” since if “one attack is clearly over, then the legal ‘clock’ resets. If no further attack is imminent, then there is nothing to

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29 Callamard, supra note 19, at § 52; Christopher Greenwood, *Caroline, The*; *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (Apr. 2009), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e26?rskey=aOGXHq&result=1&prd=OPIL (emphasis added). See also Labuda, *supra* note 19: “As with the killing of Soleimani, the US would need to show that Iran – specifically Kata’ib Hezbollah – was planning imminent attacks against the US.” While he therefore seems to accept self-defense against an armed attack that has not yet begun, it was not the crux of his contribution. It is therefore difficult to definitively place him in either camp.


32 See *supra* notes 16–18.


35 See, for example, O’Connell and Milanovic, *supra* note 19.
lawfully defend against.” While he leaves room for the possibility of defending against an “ongoing armed attack that was, if you will, arriving in waves,” he closes that door here: an ongoing series of attacks is not an ongoing attack.”

Much of that argument was endorsed (at times verbatim) by the UN Special Rapporteur, who agreed that “these attacks, to the extent that they were directed against the United States, had all concluded in the past.” And while she too admitted that “a series of attacks, collectively, could amount to an armed attack,” the attacks referred to were, on the contrary, “separate and distinct … , not necessarily escalating, … not related in time or even targets.” Moreover, even in the latter case proof would be required of “further imminent attack” to avoid blurring the distinction between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. As such, while both authors cautiously accepted self-defense against an ongoing attack that comes in different instalments (or waves), they appeared to interpret very strictly the time lapse between the last such instalment and the military action in defense.

To the second camp belong those who unapologetically endorse the ‘accumulation of events-doctrine’ (the Nadelstichtaktik or needle-prick theory), but applied it differently here. Indeed, one co-authored legal opinion puts forth that “[i]t is generally accepted that a series of limited attacks, taken in isolation, can amount to an armed attack when considered as a whole.” However, rather than relying on the fact that the last incident targeting the U.S. had definitively ended, the authors denied the doctrine’s application for three (other) reasons: (1) the case facts differed substantively from the precedents upon which the doctrine is based; (2) the U.S. already responded military on 29 December, thereby exhausting the possibility of again invoking the doctrine a few days later; and (3) a lack of “precise identification and evidence” with regard to a connection between the incidents.

Another co-authored piece pointed out that the accumulation of events doctrine required the successive attacks to be “linked in time, cause and source.” In the case at hand, and in opposition to their colleagues cited earlier, they found that the multiple attacks on U.S. troops and instalations in Iraq did meet that criterion and thus constituted an armed attack on the United States. Moreover, the authors argued that in such a scenario, unlike in the case of anticipatory self-defense, “prospective armed attacks must not be imminent” as it is “more difficult to assess whether a series of attacks is continuing or whether it has come to an end with the latest attack.” They approvingly quoted the U.S. Attorney-General’s interpretation on that point, thereby fully disagreeing with authors in the first camp.

A third JAB-issue deals with the question of whether the United States was entitled to engage in defensive action against an attack, or a series of attacks, carried out by Iran through its proxy forces in Iraq. All commentators dealing with this issue accepted that a State can be held responsible for the actions of its proxy under international law. Most refer to the complete and/or effective control tests as the relevant standards, although one confusingly also mentions

37 Callamard, supra note 19, at § 61.
38 Id, at § 57.
39 Id, at §§ 62-3. Callamard continues: “The existence of previous attacks could be a legal argument for the legality of the use of force under international humanitarian law – if an international armed conflict between the states existed prior to the strike. However, the strike itself cannot be justified on the basis of retaliation/reprisal/degrading forces under jus ad bellum.” Id, § 63.
40 Corten & others, supra note 19, at 7.
41 Id, at 7-9. The precedents referred to include the following cases at the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.): Nicaragua, supra note 34, at § 231; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, § 64 (November 6); Armed Activities, supra note 10, at § 146. The last reason does echo the views of Callamard, supra note 38.
42 Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 19, at 8. Compare with Callamard, supra note 38 and Corten & others, supra note 41.
43 Id.
44 Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 19, at 10.
45 See Farivar & Bredemeier, supra note 28.
the overall control-test. The latter was once considered a more lenient (rival) test, but has been authoritatively rejected by the International Court of Justice – at least for the purpose of attributing actions by a non-State actor to its sponsor.

Relying on the language of the official U.S. justification in its letter to the U.N. Security Council, Haque and Callamard both squarely state that attacks by “Iran-supported militias” could not be attributed to Iran on that basis alone, even if proven (quod non). Other authors at least left open the possibility that the link between Kataib Hezbollah and Iran went beyond mere material support, with some going even further than that: “Considering KH’s close ties to Iran, their open pledge of loyalty to Iran and the regular meetings with General Soleimani, there may be evidence that Iran through its Quds Force planned, ordered and controlled the KH attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.” While there was thus agreement on this aspect of the law, commentators nevertheless disagreed on its application to the facts.

A fourth and final JAB-issue centers on the location of the Soleimani-killing: the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. The opposing positions on this matter are succinctly described by Milanovic:

[Any] justification would have to work against both Iran and Iraq, because the strike took place on Iraqi territory without the consent of the Iraqi government. Pursuant to restrictivist theories of self-defence, such an argument would be a non-starter — Iran was not implicated in any imminent attacks against the US. For expansionists, this situation would be analogous to self-defence against non-state actors – using force on the territory of the state in which the attacker is located would need to be justified by the necessity of stopping the attack, e.g. pursuant to an unwilling or unable test.

Restrictivist scholars indeed firmly reject military action against a State simply because the latter fails to prevent its territory from being used as a launching pad for harmful operations against the acting State. Even if the U.S. was successful in arguing self-defence for action taken against Iran, it therefore irreparably failed to justify that defensive action on Iraqi soil.

Expansionists, however, accept that the ‘unwilling or unable-test’ may provide a justificatory route for the United States. There appear to be two competing versions of that argument. The first, according to Labuda, is that self-defence may be invoked to justify the use of force “against non-state actors operating in the territory of non-consenting states who refuse (unwilling) or do not have the military/law enforcement capabilities (unable) to

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49 Corten & others, *supra* note 19, at 6.
51 Milanovic (Jan. 7), *supra* note 19.
52 Corten & others, *supra* note 19, at 8-9. See also O’Connell, *supra* note 19: “In the event the Iraqis failed to take adequate steps, the U.S. can keep its people safe by evacuating them from Iraq.”
53 However, this assumes that KH, as part of the Popular Mobilisation Forces, had not (yet) been fully integrated into the Iraqi army, see: Corten & others, *supra* note 19, at 8-9; Callamard, *supra* note 19, at § 70. Compare with Talmon & Heipertz, *supra* note 19, at 14: “The situation here is … one of a State organ being placed at the disposal of another State. Rather than being so placed by the Iraqi Government, though, KH placed itself at the disposal of Iran. In this case, the conduct of KH can be considered only an act of Iran.”
eliminate a threat originating in their territory.”\textsuperscript{54} Applied by analogy to the case at hand, according to Milanovic, “the US would need to demonstrate that it had to strike at Soleimani when and where it did, that it could not ask the Iraqi government for permission (e.g. on the basis of its collusion with Iran) and that it could not wait to strike at Soleimani elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{55} Both Labuda and Milanovic then tackle the theory on its own merits, without thereby supporting it,\textsuperscript{56} but both conclude that doing so is unsatisfactory – given the absurd legal consequences\textsuperscript{57} and/or because the U.S. did not discharge its evidentiary burden.\textsuperscript{58}

Similarly, Special Rapporteur Callamard noted that support for the doctrine is decidedly mixed, but has nevertheless been used by States to justify the use of military force.\textsuperscript{59} Be that as it may, she denied that the doctrine could apply in the Soleimani-case for three reasons: (1) the ‘threat’ to be neutralized was a high-level State official prone to international travel, which would absurdly imply he could be targeted anywhere in the world; (2) many of the alleged attacks against the U.S. did not concern Iraq, nor was it suggested that Iraq was the intended location of one that was imminent; (3) there was no evidence that Iraq was unable or unwilling to cooperate, given its continued support in the fight against Islamic State and the absence of consultation prior to the drone strike.\textsuperscript{60}

Finally, a different conception of unable or unwilling was put forth by Talmon and Heipertz. They first discarded the former conception as “highly controversial and prone to abuse,” thereby seemingly agreeing with the restrictivist point of view.\textsuperscript{61} They then relied on the test’s “original, so-to-speak” incarnation to preclude the wrongfulness of the use of force in trilateral, inter-State relations: “Where a neutral or non-belligerent State (Iraq) does not fulfill its duties – is unable or unwilling – a belligerent (the United States) is permitted to use force in self-defence on the territory of that State against the enemy (Iran).”\textsuperscript{62} According to the authors, that understanding has long since been accepted – or was at least left open by the International Law Commission in its ARSIWA. It was moreover repeatedly alluded to by U.S. officials when pointing to Iraq’s failure in protecting U.S. troops on its territory.\textsuperscript{63}

In sum, commentators disagreed on whether the right to self-defense justifies military action against attacks that have not yet begun (or are not even about to), although none accepted that the U.S. met the evidentiary burden of even the most expansive interpretation. Moreover, while all of them accepted the accumulation of events theory, some authors argued that the attacks had ended and none were imminent whereas others argued the exact opposite point(s) of view. The latter group then disagreed about whether the past attacks were sufficiently connected for the doctrine to come into play. In addition, there was no consensus on the nature of the relationship between Kataib Hezbollah and Iran for the purpose of attributing acts of the former to the latter, thereby (possibly) justifying taking out Soleimani as the group’s alleged Hintermann. To top it all off, there were varying views on the status and

\textsuperscript{54} Labuda, supra note 19.
\textsuperscript{55} Milanovic (Jan. 7), supra note 19.
\textsuperscript{56} Labuda (supra note 19) notes: the “better view is that this controversial doctrine is rejected by most states.”
\textsuperscript{57} Labuda (id) argues that applying the doctrine in a situation where the acting State is already operating in the territorial State with the latter’s permission “effectively hollows out the ius ad bellum notion of consent.”
\textsuperscript{58} Milanovic (Jan. 7), supra note 19.
\textsuperscript{59} Callamard, supra note 19, at §§ 72-3.
\textsuperscript{60} Id, at §§ 73-8. Haque (supra note 19) also notes that “only clear evidence of an ongoing or imminent armed attack by Iran could justify the use of armed force in Iraq.” However, it is unclear what justification beyond pre-emptive self-defense against Iran he would accept for defensive action in Iraq.
\textsuperscript{61} Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 19, at 15. See also supra notes 52 and 53.
\textsuperscript{62} Id, at 15-16.
\textsuperscript{63} ARSIWA, supra note 5, at 74-5 (specifically § 5): “Article 21 leaves open all issues of the effect of action in self-defence vis-à-vis third States.” Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 19, at 15 (specifically at notes 98 and 99).
substance of the unwilling or unable-test as part of the right to self-defense, as well as on whether Iraq fulfilled either criteria.

Consequently, besides agreeing on the obvious fact that the Trump administration failed in convincingly supporting an already tenuous legal argument, international lawyers were hopelessly divided in their evaluation of the strikes’ accordance with the jus ad bellum. As shown in the preceding paragraphs, the analysis often hinges on the application of the law to the facts. A different appreciation of the fact pattern therefore likely influences the final outcome, which is to some extent unavoidable – especially when commentators offer their views when the story is still unfolding.

Much more worrisome, however, is the extent of disagreement on many applicable legal standards: Is defensive military action against imminent armed attacks allowed under international law? Does imminence (exclusively) consist of a temporal element or rather (also) include aspects of necessity and causality? Is imminence conceptualized in the same way for self-defense against a single armed attack compared to a series of pinprick attacks, or does the legal ‘clock’ then tick more slowly? At what point of interconnectedness should such a series of attacks be viewed holistically? And as for the unwilling or unable-test as part of the right to self-defense: does it apply in a trilateral, inter-State situation and/or against non-State actors? Does it constitute the law as it is or rather as (some think) it ought to be?

None of these questions have fielded clear answers, producing a kaleidoscope of legal analyses in the Soleimani-case with no indication of how to assess their respective authority. That picture becomes even more blurry when branching out to other sections of international law, as will be shown below.

2.2.2 Were the drone strikes in conformity with the jus in bello and/or international human rights law?

As rightfully pointed out by Christof Heyns, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: “For a particular drone strike to be lawful under international law it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes.” Moving on, then, from the law on going to war (jus ad bellum – discussed in the previous section) to the law on waging war (jus in bello), many commentators wondered whether the drone strikes that killed General Soleimani triggered (or continued) an international armed conflict between the United States and Iran/Iraq and were, therefore, ruled by the jus in bello. Alternatively, the strikes would have been launched during peacetime, but then raise the question whether the U.S. violated its international human rights obligations by killing no less than 10 individuals, even if that use of deadly force occurred outside American territory.

Again, there was a wide variety of views among the experts. Perhaps the most straightforward one held that the strikes ipso facto initiated an international armed conflict (IAC) and therefore fell to be examined under the rules of JIB. This flows from the so-called ‘first shot-rule’, which prescribes that “[u]nlike in the case of non-international armed conflicts, where it must be proved that the hostilities have reached a certain threshold of intensity … , a single attack is sufficient to trigger an international armed conflict.” To the group of experts examining the strikes

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65 Corten & others, supra note 19, at 16. See also Corn & Jenks, supra note 19: “At a minimum, with the first ‘shot fired’—the first missile the U.S. launched—an armed conflict between the U.S. and Iran existed.”
According to JIB also belong those who considered (or at least did not exclude the possibility) that the IAC had been ongoing since the attacks against U.S. troops and installations in Iraq began in November 2019.

Among these experts, some simply concluded that General Soleimani constituted a legitimate military target: “Where a military officer in command of the forces and capabilities creating the imminent threat of armed attack is lawfully and successfully subjected to attack, the killing was legally justified.” Talmon and Heipertz came to that same conclusion, albeit after a somewhat more complex reasoning. While the strikes triggered an (or, in their view, were part of a pre-existing) IAC between the U.S. and Iran, the jus in bello was not the only applicable legal framework. International human rights law would have to be considered also: “both bodies of law are, in principle, applicable side by side and are complementary.” However, the authors denied that Soleimani was under the jurisdiction of the U.S. at the time he was targeted by American drones. Without such (extraterritorial) jurisdiction, the U.S. was not bound to protect Soleimani’s human rights. And even if that were to be the case, his right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life was not violated. Given the context of an international armed conflict, that right must be interpreted in light of relevant jus in bello – as a member of the Iranian armed forces, Soleimani was an enemy combatant; and thus a legitimate military target after all.

A similar analytical framework was adopted by Corten, Lagerwall, Koutroulis and Dubuisson: If the strikes “are contrary to the law of armed conflict, then [they] also constitute an ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life contrary to article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” However, unlike their colleagues, they concluded that the strikes may have contravened JIB for two reasons: (1) No enemy combatant may be killed perfidiously through an ‘assassination,’ which, according to some domestic interpretations, prohibits singling out “a specific person on the adversary’s side and request[ing] his death;” (2) Soleimani may have been involved in negotiations between Iran and Saudi Arabia with Iraqi mediation at the time of his killing. If true, he was protected from harm given his status as parlementaire. If either scenario was applicable, the strikes violated JIB and, therefore, IHRL also.

Other commentators were not satisfied by that framework. Janik, for example, began by accepting that even isolated targeted killings could meet the definition of (ultra-short) international armed conflicts. But relying on the work of Jann Kleffner, he then suggested that this would not trigger the full body of JIB-rules: “only the protective dimension of the principle of distinction – the prohibition to directly target civilians – should be applied to situations of targeted killings of a foreign state’s armed forces.” Importantly, lethal force could not be legitimized on the basis of military

66 Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 19, at 11-12; Milanovic (Jan. 8), supra note 19: “It is now also unambiguously clear that, as a matter of international humanitarian law, an international armed conflict (IAC) exists between the US and Iran. ... It is also perfectly possible that the IAC preceded Soleimani’s killing, for example due to fighting between the US and Iranian proxies in Iraq.”
67 Corn & Jenks, supra note 19. See also Milanovic (Jan. 8), supra note 19: “To the extent that IHL applied, both the killing of Soleimani and the Iranian missile strike in response were lawful, since the attacks were directed at combatants and military objects, in compliance with the principle of distinction.”
68 Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 19, at 12.
69 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), December 16th, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Art. 6(1): “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”
70 Id., at 11-13.
73 Janik (Part I), supra note 19.
74 Janik (Part II), supra note 19.
necessity or proportionality – leaving such force to be determined exclusively on the basis of IHRL. Janik then concluded that the U.S. indeed “seems to have violated [Soleimani’s] right to life.”

In yet another approach, Gurmendi first adopts two premises: “(i) a strike that violated the *jus ad bellum* is arbitrary and therefore unlawful under IHRL and ... (ii) IHL of IACs applies from the moment an attack begins with hostile intent, and therefore the first strike will usually occur after IHL is triggered.” Rather than assessing an arbitrary deprivation of life on the basis of *jus in bello*, Gurmendi connects it to, and makes it dependent on, the *jus ad bellum*.

As a result, the two tests apply simultaneously but lead to opposing results: under JIB the strike is lawful, under JAB (and thus IHRL) it is not. According to Gurmendi, which test and outcome prevail depends on the analyst.

Finally, the UN Special Rapporteur considered that, on balance, the *jus in bello* did not apply at all: “The US and Iran had not been and have not been considered to be involved in an IAC before or after the strike and the strike occurred in a civilian setting in an area outside of active hostilities and in a non-belligerent State.” She came to that conclusion after considering numerous ‘challenges’ to the first shot-rule: (1) taking all incidents between Iran-supported militias and the U.S. into account, it was unclear whether there were dozens of IACs or a single (on-going) IAC or none at all; (2) most institutional and individual commentators stopped short of labeling the tensions between Iran and the U.S. as a fully-fledged armed conflict – as did the States themselves; (3) the geographical scope of the IAC and, therefore, its protagonists were uncertain; and (4) while there may be valid and pragmatic reasons to apply *jus in bello* in this case, it may not be the best “fit, for lack of a better word.” However, unlike Talmon and Heipertz, Callamard did consider that using a drone to take out an individual abroad was “the ultimate exercise of physical power and control over the individual.” Consequently, the U.S. was bound by its human rights obligations, even if the action took place on the territory of Iraq. Moreover, she agreed that an act of aggression involving the loss of life was necessarily arbitrary. As a result, the “course of action taken by the US was unlawful.”

Again, the discord among commentators was astonishing. All agreed that in order to be lawful the strikes must not have fallen foul of any applicable legal regime. However, some thought that only pertained to (part of) the *jus in bello*, while others considered the answer to lie exclusively in international human rights law. Hybrid views also existed: certain experts thought both frameworks applied, but whether the deprivation of life was arbitrary under IHRL fell to be determined under JIB. Others disagreed, tying IHRL to JAB: an act of aggression involving souls lost is arbitrary by definition. Finally, there were some who claimed both frameworks applied, but led to opposing results and whoever is called upon to assess must decide between the two. The disagreement by no means ended there. Sub-debates involved the extraterritorial application of human rights law for targeted drone strikes, the intensity threshold for IACs, and Soleimani as a(n illegitimate) military target.

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76 Id.
77 Gurmendi, supra note 19.
78 This reasoning is based on Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 – Article 6: Right to Life, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/66/36 (Sep. 3, 2019), at § 70.
79 Gurmendi, supra note 19. He takes the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as an example and argues it is likely to take the ‘pro homine’-approach, allowing IHRL to trump JIB: “As such, faced with two possible routes to decide a case, the Commission would choose the one that favors individual rights over state rights. Seen through Latin American eyes, Soleimani would have been murdered, not targeted.”
80 Callamard, supra note 19, at § 39.
81 Id., at §§ 15-39.
82 Id., at § 40-3. Compare with Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 70.
83 Id., at § 44 (compare with Gurmendi, supra note 78). For further analysis under IHRL, see id., at §§ 45-53.
84 Id., at § 82.
As announced at the outset, this article does not aim to take a position in that legal debate — difficult as that may be. Rather, the following sections will launch a preliminary examination into the question why a similar set of facts is evaluated so differently by commentators who claim to apply the same set of rules and whose expertise is beyond reproach.

3 Tentative explanations

3.1 International law as a (pseudo)science

Koskenniemi famously wrote that international law is fundamentally indeterminate and that, as a consequence, it is possible to “defend any course of action – including deviation from a clear rule – by professionally impeccable legal arguments.”85 He further argued that international law is, therefore, “singularly useless as a means for justifying or criticizing international behaviour.”86 His views can be situated within the critical legal studies (CLS) movement that was introduced into international law by the so-called New Stream in the 1980s.87 The latter inspired a whole range of new approaches to international law (NAILs), including third-world and feminist critiques of the field. Such critical approaches have since chipped away at international law’s claims to determinacy, objectivity, neutrality, impartiality and expertise.88 Importantly, the “newstream’ has become the mainstream” as “critical scholarship is usually taken far more seriously than doctrinal scholarship.”89

Additionally, Bianchi compares interpretation in international law to a game, where the players (or interpreters) must secure adherence to their own interpretation of the law in order to triumph. These players have several cards (or interpretive techniques) at their disposal, but which card to play and when is ultimately “left to the skills and strategies of the individual players.”90 Similarly, while international law accommodates a wide range of theories and methodologies, the academy now appears to agree that no approach is scientifically superior to any other – leaving international lawyers completely free to follow their preferences.91 As a result, an author may not be criticized for a methodological choice as such, but criticism is certainly warranted in case that choice is not made explicit upfront and/or its intrinsic requirements are (consequently) abandoned.92

Moreover, Orford has argued that “[a] theory of scientific method is ... a theory of knowledge ... is a theory of language and its limits.”93 While the general commitment to scientific values such as rationality and objectivity may be universal, what that commitment prescribes concretely in forms of conduct, means of producing knowledge and relations to the State is by no means static, similar to the continuous development of language – including that of

86 Id, at 600.
91 Olivier Corten, Methodologie du droit international public 80-3 (2017); Jean D’Aspremont, Epistemic Forces in International Law – Foundational Techniques of International Legal Argumentation 179-80 (2016): “[T]here is no methodological package that is, a priori, endowed with more validity or force than another. There are just a multitude of methodological packages which, in practice, are endorsed by professionals without any of them having any methodological or theoretical ascendency over the other.”
92 Corten, supra note 91, at 80-3.
93 Orford, supra note 7, at 384.
international law.\textsuperscript{94} Finally, in a ground-breaking monograph, Roberts collected a vast body of empirical evidence showing that international law is understood differently in different States. Employing the same analogy as Orford, she strikingly concluded that international law is “caught between the ideal of Esperanto and the reality of both multilingualism and English as the lingua franca” and is therefore unlikely to ever be fully “international.”\textsuperscript{95}

The understanding that international law is inherently indeterminate, characterized by a methodological free-for-all and epistemic flux, and its interpretation the result of strategic choices informed by extralegal factors seems to squarely challenge the conceptualization of international law as a science by the likes of Oppenheim with which this article started. It moreover threatens the law’s legitimacy and may foster noncompliance.\textsuperscript{96} Writing in 2019, Klabbers lamented that the evolution (broadly) sketched out meant that

\begin{quote}
international legal method is no longer about possible ways of finding out what the law says but, rather, about possible ways of doing academic research. International law .. is no longer about what states do, but .. about what international lawyers do. .. [T] is become transfixed by methodological debates, with each faction occupying its own corner and being reluctant to look outside.\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

Many of these insights are exemplified by the case study under review. Admittedly, it may be unrealistic to expect authors to set out their foundational assumptions – for example on their theoretical and methodological approach – in detail at the outset of each piece of legal commentary, especially when destined for the fast-paced blogosphere (let alone Twittersphere). Regardless, it makes a world of difference whether, as just one example, an author is mulling the law as it \textit{is} as opposed to how (s)he thinks it \textit{should} be.

Take the opinion of Callamard, expressed in her official capacity as UN Specially Rapporteur, wherein she firmly derides as an “anachronism” the view that a targeted, extraterritorial killing carried out by a State does not engage its human rights obligations.\textsuperscript{98} That interpretation ultimately harkens back to the position adopted by the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) in General Comment (GC) 36.\textsuperscript{99} However, the HRC’s Special Rapporteur admitted that GC36 merely \textit{suggested} that such an interpretation would indeed be covered by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).\textsuperscript{100} And while the views of the HRC on the ICCPR may have “great weight,” they “in no way” represent a binding interpretation of the treaty.\textsuperscript{101} The issue here is not with the modalities of the ICCPR’s extraterritorial application, but rather with its presentation as \textit{settled law} by a high-level UN official whose views on the Soleimani-case have been broadcast around the world.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Id}, at 372.

\textsuperscript{95} \textbf{Anthea Roberts, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL?} 325 (2017).

\textsuperscript{96} For example, on \textit{semantic} indeterminacy Franck commented: “But indeterminacy also has its costs, which are paid in the coin of legitimacy. Not only do indeterminate normative standards make it harder to know what is expected—perhaps because the authorities responsible for the rule text were themselves uncertain, or could not agree, or wished to preserve flexibility for the future, or just did not see the issue but indeterminacy also makes it easier to justify non-compliance. To put it conversely, the more determinate a standard, the more difficult it is to justify non-compliance. Since few persons or states wish to be perceived as acting in flagrant violation of a generally recognized rule of conduct, they may try to resolve a conflict between the demands of the rule and their desire for interest gratification by “interpreting” the rule permissively.” See: \textbf{Thomas M. Franck, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS} 53–4 (1990).

\textsuperscript{97} Klabbers, \textit{ supra} note 8, at 1062.

\textsuperscript{98} Callamard, \textit{ supra} note 19, at § 43.

\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Id}, at note 198. But see also the single British case, quoted in note 200. For GC36, see \textit{ supra} note 78.


Or take the (currently most popular) blog post on *Opinio Juris* wherein Gurmendi bolsters the IHRL-JAB connection, again relying on GC36 (and the work of Haque). The same HRC Special Rapporteur on this point noted:

The interpretation embraced by the General Comment is that the term arbitrary deprivation of life in the ICCPR also has to be construed in light of other relevant norms of international law. *Hence*, a loss of life directly resulting from an act or omission in violation of another relevant norm of international law, such as the norms of IHL, *jus ad bellum* or other basic human rights norms, would be regarded *ipso facto* as a violation of the right to life.

However, that interpretive move is unsupported by a single source in the GC. It is unclear how the HRC came to its conclusion and, consequently, why Gurmendi found that view – as opposed to the more traditional one connecting IHRL to JIB – to be “the most convincing.” Again, the issue is not with that position *in se*, but rather with its pretense of hard law and the ease with which a fundamental shift in legal doctrine seems to blow past unopposed.

Another illuminating methodological distinction in the jus ad bellum specifically was set out by Waxman (and Corten before him) that sheds more light on the documented cacophony among experts in the Soleimani-case. According to Waxman,

(1) Bright-Liners, the legality of resort to force by individual states or groups of states should operate as an on–off switch, flipped by the manifestation of readily identifiable factual preconditions, not shaded or uncertain assessments. … Balancers, by contrast, view legality of resort to force as more like a dimmer knob than an on–off switch. … Balancers believe that use of force beyond that authorized by the Security Council should be regulated by flexible standards that take account of contextual factors and the various policy interests animating international law, and that this approach better reflects state practice. … To be clear, these two orientations – Bright-Liners and Balancers – actually represent segments along a spectrum of possible views. … [and] each incorporates some elements of the other’s preferred form.

To some extent, the preference for one over another appears influenced by the authors’ background and training: “US authors tend to situate themselves more within the [second] current, the others (most notably the Europeans) the [first]. The correspondence is by no means absolute.”

One example of that methodological clash in the Soleimani-case is the discussion about which elements go into the imminence-analysis pertaining to the right to self-defense. As we have seen, some experts argued that imminence (at most) relates to the armed attack’s temporal proximity. has it already begun or is it about to? Others, however, disagreed and included elements of necessity and causality, using imminence more as a “rhetorical device than a...
genuinely useful legal concept – an armed attack will be regarded as imminent if responding to the attack is necessary now, regardless of when and how exactly the attack will take place. Both approaches appear to find themselves on opposite sides of Waxman’s spectrum opposing Bright-Liners (on-off switch) and Balancers (dimmer knob).

Similarly, the unwilling or unable-test operates as a workaround for conducting a targeted killing on the territory of a State absent consent and Security Council authorization. According to Callamard, the test was developed by the U.S. and other States since 9/11 and has been used to “justify targeting inter alia the Taliban in Afghanistan, and ISIL in Syria.” Following a balancing approach to the right to self-defense, it is reasonable to argue in favor of its admissibility if the defensive military action was necessary to counter a threat at a specific time and in a specific location, taking into account the territorial State’s collusion with the enemy. Conversely, a Bright-Liner considers that such an interpretation is “incompatible both with existing legal instruments (no text allows such a possibility) and with the consistent case-law of the International Court of Justice.”

Stripping down the respective lines of argumentation thus reveals a methodological assumption at their core that is inspired by strategic choices and an (alleged) indeterminacy of the international legal language – often with diametrically opposed outcomes. Two inferences may be drawn: First, the influential critical approaches to international law propagated moving away from the science of international law as perhaps most famously described in Oppenheim’s seminal article. The logical consequence is that the search for a ‘correct answer on the law’ is viewed with much suspicion (if not derision). Second, even those professionals that do not travel down that road – and they are plentiful too – have become much more tolerant towards the free choice of theoretical and methodological approach by their peers. As a result, every interpretation of international law becomes equally defensible, even if not (necessarily) equally convincing. This much is glaringly evident from the Soleimani-case.

### 3.2 The absence of an authoritative arbiter

The foregoing is reinforced by the absence of a universally accepted method or institution to decide between, or (broadly) rank according to authoritativeness, the multitude of diverging interpretations of international law and their application to a contentious case. It seems as if all interpretations are allowed to stand, resulting in the ever-greater fragmentation of international law. Nor is there an international arbiter capable of taking on that fateful role. Even the International Court of Justice, that comes closest, is fully dependent on States’ consent to decide a dispute between them and take that opportunity to clarify outstanding international legal issues (often in obiter dicta).

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85 Milanovic (Jan. 7), supra note 19.
86 In a similar vein, see Monica Hakimi’s provocative article entitled Making Sense of Customary International Law (118 Mich. L. R. 1487 (2020)) – and the symposium hosted by the Opinio Juris blog: http://opiniojuris.org/2020/07/06/symposium-on-hakimis-making-sense-of-customary-international-law/ – wherein she takes firm issue with the so-called rulebook-conception of customary international law (arguably a concept more in tune with Bright-Liners).
87 Callamard, supra note 19, § 72.
88 Milanovic (Jan. 7), supra note 19, Talmont & Heipertz, supra note 19, at 14.
89 Corten & others, supra note 19, at 9.
90 In this case, the indeterminacy could involve the term ‘imminence,’ or may be found in the formulation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970)): “Nothing … shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.” (emphasis added)
92 See: Alain Pellet, Article 58, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 858 (2nd ed, Andreas Zimmermann & others, 2012): “the Court remains the most prestigious of all and the only one having a general competence for all legal disputes …; its status as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations enhances its authority as does its composition, both wide … and diversified …; its organic permanence and precedence in time has enabled the Court to elaborate an impressive case law without equal.”
Moreover, relatively speaking such judgments by the ICJ (or any other international court, for that matter) are few and far between.\(^{119}\)

However, the ICJ does rely on "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."\(^{120}\) Generally, and in the abstract, it is (supposed to be) the soundness, trustworthiness and persuasiveness – or, in a word: quality – of those subsidiary sources that determines their influence on international law.\(^{121}\) The U.S. Supreme Court in Paquete Habana case phrased it as follows:

> International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction ... For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.\(^{122}\)

In addition, the ‘teachings’ of expert bodies with a globally diverse composition, with the International Law Commission as a prime example, carries a greater weight than those of individual scholars. Nevertheless, the work of such a collective often takes years before wrapping up. After all, rather than provide play-by-play commentary, these institutions play the long game. Furthermore, their views are not always adopted by consensus (internal disagreement),\(^{124}\) may contradict those adopted by colleagues (external disagreement),\(^{125}\) and also do not always clearly distinguish between the codification of international law and its progressive development.\(^{126}\)

D’Aspremont pointedly described the state of affairs as follows: “the intellectual prison of custom seems to be gradually transformed into a large dance floor where (almost) every step and movement is allowed or, at least, tolerated”\(^ {127}\) While he was commenting specifically on international custom as a primary source of international law, the same can be said to apply to (sources of) the field more broadly. Arguably, this phenomenon is fueled by the lack of a fireproof way to distinguish between authoritative and speculative interpretations.

And again, these concerns are borne out by the Soleimani-case. For example, commentators were willing to judge the official U.S. justifications on their own merits – even if the standards they invoked did not accurately reflect international law. Milanovic confronted the U.S. position on self-defense head-on by proceeding “for the sake of the

\(^{119}\) Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Annex to the U.N. Charter, supra note 116).

\(^{120}\) One particularly powerful example is the fact that much of our contemporary understanding of the jus ad bellum still relies on the judgment of the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua case (supra note 34), which dates back to 1986.

\(^{121}\) Article 38(1)(d) of the I.C.J. Statute

\(^{122}\) See also: Von Bogdandy, as quoted in Pellet, supra note 118, at 856.

\(^{123}\) The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 677 (1900) (emphasis added).

\(^{124}\) See, for example: Georg Nolte, The Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on Military Assistance on Request, 45 BEL. REV. DE INTL. L. 241.


\(^{126}\) This is a reference to the ILC’s twofold task. Article 15 of the Statute of the ILC, see: G.A. Res 174(II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/174(II) (Nov. 21, 1947).

\(^{127}\) D’Aspremont, supra note 90 (emphasis added).
argument, on the assumption that these expansive positions [espoused by the U.S.] are correct.” He concluded that “even if we took the US views of applicable international law on their own terms, ... it would be difficult to argue that the killing of Soleimani was lawful.” Therefore, while he thought it unlikely that the U.S. could discharge its evidentiary burden, it was “not inconceivable that it could do so” and the “Soleimani strike [was] thus not clearly unlawful in the way some previous military actions of the Trump administration have been.” Taken together, it remains unclear what legal standard of self-defense Milanovic himself espouses, given his refusal to take a firm stance in the debate. On the contrary, Labuda noted upfront that his analysis took “for granted the expansionist ius ad bellum doctrine known as ‘unable or unwilling’ (U/U)” even if “[t]he better view is that this controversial doctrine is rejected by most states.” Nevertheless, he then considered that “since the US is one of its proponents, I examine the doctrine’s potential applicability in this post.”

But do these thought experiments, reasoning along with a justification that the commentator considers problematic under international law (to say the least), not inadvertently bolster its authoritativeness? After all, the influential report by the UN Special Rapporteur did not dismiss the unwilling or unable-test outright and merely admitted that “the support for this doctrine is mixed, but it has been used to justify the use of military force,” and then continued her analysis with “[e]ven if valid, the ‘unwilling and unable’ doctrine does not justify the strike within Iraq.”

Perhaps, that laissez-faire attitude and refusal to disregard a clearly outlandish reading of the law may reinforce the questionable or even pernicious view that in the interpretation and application of international law “everything goes,” indeed.

### 3.3 Academic Idiosyncrasies

Finally, it is worth considering a more general and pragmatic explanation for the fundamental discord among expert commentators in case studies such as the one under review. Indeed, perhaps the requirements imposed by modern-day academia, to zoom in on just one type of commentator, unavoidably lead to a dizzying variety of views including on the (substance and application of some of the) law’s most foundational norms. For example, Klabbers insightfully noted that

> The system of incentives that has been put into place over the last couple of decades, with its emphasis on quick fixes, on quantity and on impact, not only stimulates particular ways of doing academic work but also stimulates a particular ethos. That ethos is one of drama – high drama. In order to be successful, grand claims and big promises must be made. ... Research projects cannot be proposed merely because one is interested in figuring things out; the least that is expected is the promise of a 'paradigm shift'.

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128 Milanovic (Jan. 7), supranote 19 (emphasis added).
129 Id.
130 Labuda, supranote 19.
131 See Callamard, supra note 19, at §§ 72-3. She too reasoned along with expansive interpretations of the controversial unwilling or unable-test, put forth by wayward States and taken seriously by authors. Compare that approach to the one taken by Corten & others (supranote 19, at 9) or Talmon & Heipertz (supranote 19, at 15). A comparable, but equally problematic, analytical move takes the official State justification too literally. For example, both Haque and Callamard (supra note 48) first note that the U.S. justification refers to “Iran-supported militias” and then use that formulation to deny possible attribution of militia actions to Iran as “assistance ... in the form ... of weapons or logistical or other support” does not constitute an armed attack.” But by taking the official justification at face value, commentators may miss the chance to address the legal issue at the crux of the case.
132 D’Aspremont, supranote 90.
133 Klabbers, supranote 8, at 1066.
In addition, Sassoli assessed that the importance of scholarly writings has diminished. His appreciation of its causes is remarkably similar to that of Klabbers and, as they support many of the arguments made above, deserves to be reproduced in some detail:

“An academic career cannot be pursued by honestly describing the existing law, but only by suggesting ‘new interpretations’, ‘thinking outside the box’ or ‘deconstructing’ everything written previously. This leads to the impression that a reference may be found in favour of any position. The increasing number of publications on every imaginable IHL problem, the race in the academic world towards a quantitative evaluation of research output useful for a career and the need to raise funds for research by imagining innovative projects that claim a ‘paradigm shift’ is needed all reinforce this tendency. ... Scholars following some contemporary schools of international law often proudly refuse to state whether their positions reflect lex lata or lex ferenda as they consider this distinction to be outdated and irrelevant.”

Consequently, the intense incentive to produce as much scholarship as possible may actually cause the decline of its (respective) impact. This is what D’Aspremont – always great in coming up with a fitting moniker – describes as leading to a “wasteland of academic overproduction.” Weiler concurs and laments that “everybody is so busy writing these days, publishing, self-publishing and then self-promoting ... that hardly any time is left for ... serious, reflective reading.” Even more dramatically, he believes that this imposes an “immense, self-defeating pressure” on young scholars.

Perhaps these are nothing more than loosely connected observations – albeit made by giants in the field of international law. Nevertheless, the combination of sustained pressure on (early-career) academics to be quantitatively productive above all else and overthrow, rather than build upon, established doctrines in international law for professional advancement indeed helps to better understand the explosion of views on some of its most cardinal principles. Perversely, in the long-term this may lead to the diminished impact of legal scholars. However, none of that should be interpreted as a defense of engrained notions of international law or moral or otherwise principled grounds. Quite the contrary, convincingly arguing for the progressive development of international law first necessitates a clear-eyed understanding of the law as it stands today. After all, as insightfully put by Hart, “[a] concept of law which allows the invalidity of law to be distinguished from its immorality, enables us to see the complexity and variety of these separate issues; whereas a narrow concept of law which denies legal validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to them.”

Conflating those roles would be putting the cart before the horse and undermines the persuasiveness of any suggested reform from the get-go.

4 Conclusion

The issues identified on the previous pages will likely not come as a shock to members of the international legal community and will perhaps not even be thought of as problematic at all. During a doctoral workshop in 2016, one of the prominent academics referred to above strongly advised the audience against gearing research towards clarifying the substance of a primary rule of international law. Supposedly, such research would run the risk of being undercut by equally convincing argumentation – the law is indeterminate after all. That message is ubiquitous and research

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that plainly describes, elucidates or specifies the law is often considered outmoded, erroneous, and, frankly, just not that interesting.\textsuperscript{138}

Be that as it may, this article takes the position that the current state of affairs is no cause for celebration either. Indeed, by being so spectacularly divided on the legal appraisal of such visible and controversial State action as the killing of Qasem Soleimani by the United States, the authority of international lawyers is fundamentally conquered. When international lawyers as a professional class fail in their primary task to determine with precision whether contentious State conduct is or is not in accordance with the edicts of international law and, consequently, does or does not entail international responsibility, States have their choice of expert to cover their actions under a veneer of legality. This reduces international law to a fig leaf for power politics, making it impossible to meaningfully impact State behavior.\textsuperscript{139}

It may go without saying that the reasons underlying the discord among international lawyers require more in-depth examination and research than was possible in a single conference contribution. Hopefully, however, touching upon some of them here – i.e., methodological and theoretical libertarianism, epistemic egalitarianism, and academic industrialism – can help to ignite a much-needed debate on the issue. In the end, Koskenniemi is also famous for his statement that international law is “what international lawyers do and how they think about what they are doing.”\textsuperscript{140}

But perhaps it is time to consider the opposite point of view – and let the law again take precedence over the lawyer.

\textsuperscript{138} Jörg Kammerhofer, \textit{International Legal Positivism, in The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law} 407 (Anne Orford & Flo\-\'\-rian Hoffman eds, 2016): “No fashion-conscious international lawyer would be caught dead espousing positivism.” Another example is provided by Olivier Corten (\textit{Le positivisme juridique aujourd’hui: Science ou science-fiction?}, Que\-\'\-b. J. Int’l. L. 19, 40 (2016)) who relayed a debate he witnessed between proponents of traditional and critical approaches to international law: « son collègue lui réplique que ce type d’analyse, qui se concentre sur les arguments juridiques des États, notamment en vue de proposer ou écarter une interprétation de la coutume, n’est « pas intéressante », et même qu’elle repose sur une méthodologie erronée ».

\textsuperscript{139} See, for example, the debate in the Belgian Parliament on the decision to expand military operations against the so-called Islamic State from Iraq to Syria, with opposing parties relying on contradicting legal scholarship on the unwitting or unable-test: Tom Ruys, Luca Ferro and Tim Haesebrouck, \textit{Parliamentary War Powers and the Role of International Law in Foreign Troop Deployment Decisions: The US-led Coalition against “Islamic States” in Iraq and Syria}, 17 Int’l. Const. L. 118, 158-9 (2019). For a highly topical – yet slightly different – example, see the bald-faced admission by the government of the United Kingdom that it would break international law “in a very specific and limited way” through a reinterpretation of the special Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland. Prime Minister Boris Johnson noted such action was necessary to guard against the EU’s “proven willingness” to interpret aspects of the agreement in ‘absurd’ ways, ‘simply to exert leverage’ in the trade talks.” That position would be bad enough in itself, but was justified by the understanding of top legal officers that “an established principle of international law is subordinate to the much more fundamental principle of parliamentary sovereignty.” See Lisa O’Carroll, \textit{Government Admits New Brexit Bill “Will Break International Law”}, The Guardian (Sep. 8, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/sep/08/government-admits-new-brexit-bill-will-break-international-law; Paul Lewis and Owen Boscott, \textit{Government’s Top Legal Advisers Divided over Move to Override Brexit Deal}, The Guardian (Sep. 10, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/sep/10/governments-top-legal-advisers-divided-over-move-to-override-brexit-deal; Brexit: Boris Johnson Says Powers Will Ensure UK Cannot Be “Broken Up”, BBC News (Sep. 14, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-54153302.