Research & publications 2024

With the oceans covering 70% of the world’s surface, one might be under the illusion that every State might find sufficient space for their activities, nothing could be further from the truth. This was proven once more in January 2022 and August 2023 when Russian vessels sought to engage in military exercises within strategic areas of the Irish and Norwegian exclusive economic zones (EEZs), choosing some of the local fishermen’s preferred locations in the process. Unlike their governments, the local fishermen refused to accept the Russian intrusions and via continuous protest through presence succeeded in forcing the Russian Navy to move the exercises to another area. This example is proof that to this day, the legal framework of the EEZ still gives rise to significant questions and uncertainties, often to the benefit of lawfare lawyers, especially in regards to foreign military activities and overlapping uses of the same area. Art. 56 LOSC awards sovereign resource rights to the coastal State, but arts. 58 and 87 LOSC grant the maritime user State the freedom to navigate. How to reconcile these different uses has for a long time occupied the minds of law of the sea lawyers. In this article, an attempt is made - utilizing a selection of national and international jurisprudence - to clarify the relation between these different uses of the EEZ, their permissibility and why the fishermen’s success in these cases might not so easily be translated into general international law.

The human right to a healthy environment is increasingly recognized in international law and in case law. This recognition focused at first mostly on the impact of pollution on human health, and in recent years on the impact of climate change on human health. Scientific knowledge on the positive contribution of biodiversity on human health and the negative impact of biodiversity loss on human health is fairly recent, as is the recognition of the link between biodiversity and the right to a healthy environment. In recent years we have seen growing attention to this link in both international human rights law and in international environmental law. However, this link should be strengthened. We put forward three possible pathways: through a more explicit legal recognition and concretization of the right to a biodiverse environment; through addressing the problems of biodiversity loss and its impact on human health at the source in decision-making; and through strategic biodiversity litigation using human rights arguments.

Ecological restoration has emerged as one of the leading paradigms in the context of environmental governance during the past decades. With the release of a Proposal for an EU restoration law in 2022, the European Commission underlined the pioneering role of the European Union in this regard. In this chapter, we analyse the precise alignment between ecological restoration and a rights-based approach to nature protection. Using the recently proposed EU restoration law as a benchmark, this chapter finds that a rights-based approach to ecological restoration might engender some additional complexities yet ultimately presents itself as a logical lever for more comprehensive restoration efforts on the European continent.

In 2022, the European Commission proposed an EU Nature Restoration Law (Proposal). This was a groundbreaking proposal and would be the first comprehensive piece of binding international legislation that holds legally binding targets and deadlines for landscape-wide restoration. Although the Proposal initially received very positive reactions from a variety of stakeholders, including scientists, organizations, and companies, certain lobby groups—mainly from the primary sectors (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries)—led a strong campaign against the Proposal, often based on unfounded arguments and short-term considerations. After several nail-biting voting rounds, a political compromise on an amended text was finally reached and awaits final approval. The Compromise still provides an appropriate legal basis for upscaling restoration within the EU through clear targets on restoration for different ecosystems and implementation obligations for Member States. However, we argue that, since the Compromise weakens the Proposal on some vital points regarding the operationalization of restoration at the national level, it remains uncertain whether the final law will produce the tangible effects that are necessary in the coming years.

As of today, the framework of ocean governance of coastal maritime areas created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is well understood and accepted by the international community. However, there are large and important areas of ocean space around the world that are subject to a more nuanced framework of interrelated norms. These are maritime areas that have come under the effective control of occupying States, often through the use of force. As such, the legal framework applicable to these maritime areas is that of the law of occupation. Nevertheless, because of the specificities of the zonal maritime regimes established under UNCLOS, the application of the law of occupation is seldom as straightforward at sea as it is on land. The objective of this article is therefore to shed some light on the application of the law of occupation at sea, and in doing so arrive at a comprehensive analysis of the rights and duties of occupying States in maritime areas.

Naast heel wat opportuniteiten, brengt het nieuwe Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ)-verdrag ook verschillende vragen met zich mee. De ambities zijn weliswaar duidelijk, maar hoe deze precies verwezenlijkt zullen worden en welke impact dit zal hebben op allerhande activiteiten op volle zee is vooralsnog minder helder. De component van het BBNJ-verdrag die in principe de grootste invloed op de scheepvaart teweeg zou moeten brengen, betreft de creatie van gebiedsgerichte beheersinstrumenten en – meer specifiek – mariene beschermde gebieden. Met het VN-Zeerechtverdrag als hoeksteen en diverse internationaalrechtelijke concepten ter verdere uitwerking ervan, kan het BBNJ-verdrag op een aantal instrumenten voortbouwen, maar de huidige praktijk met betrekking tot Special Areas en Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA’s) toont aan dat de vrijheid van scheepvaart tot dusver de overhand heeft. Het BBNJ-verdrag faciliteert weliswaar de oprichting van mariene beschermde gebieden op volle zee en creëert een nieuw elan, maar aangezien de Internationale Maritieme Organisatie thans slechts zeer uitzonderlijk beperkingen oplegt aan het scheepvaartverkeer, lijkt een ingrijpende cultuuromslag in de nabije toekomst eerder onwaarschijnlijk. Indien er toch een dergelijke doorbraak komt, is het aangewezen om de potentiële gevolgen op het vlak van scheepvaartemissies in toenemende mate te betrekken bij het overleg omtrent mariene beschermde gebieden, zodat kortzichtige beslissingen – die de bredere context uit het oog verliezen – vermeden worden.

De auteur onderzoekt in welke mate de werkpunten en lacunes met betrekking tot transparantie, publieke participatie en toegang tot de rechter binnen de context van diepzeemijnbouw in de voorbije vier jaar aangepakt zijn. Hiermee blikt de auteur terug op zijn eerdere bijdrage die hij schreef met Hendrik Schoukens: “Procedurele milieurechten en diepzeemijnbouw. Terra incognita?”, in NjW verschenen op 15 januari 2020 in aflevering 414.

Diepzeemijnbouw vormt een groeiend juridisch en ecologisch spanningsveld binnen het internationaal zeerecht. Terwijl industriële actoren deze praktijk promoten als een noodzakelijke bron van kritieke metalen voor de mondiale energietransitie, waarschuwen milieuorganisaties voor de onvoorspelbare en potentieel onomkeerbare schade aan het mariene ecosysteem. In afwezigheid van een bindend moratorium, nemen protestacties op zee toe, waaronder de interventie van Greenpeace tegen het Belgische bedrijf Global Sea Mineral Resources (GSR) in de Stille Oceaan in 2021. Deze acties, waarbij fysieke verstoring van mijnbouwtests plaatsvond, roepen fundamentele juridische vragen op over de reikwijdte van het recht op vreedzaam protest op volle zee, de verhouding tot de maritieme vrijheden, en de rol van de Internationale Zeebodemautoriteit (ISA) als regulerende instantie.

Dit artikel onderzoekt de juridische toelaatbaarheid van dergelijke protestvormen aan de hand van verdragsrechtelijke bepalingen, ISA-regelgeving en relevante nationale wetgeving. Daarbij wordt geanalyseerd in hoeverre activisme op zee verenigbaar is met het internationaal recht, welke handhavingsmechanismen beschikbaar zijn bij potentiële inbreuken, en wie bevoegd is om deze te activeren. De studie biedt een genuanceerd inzicht in de juridische grenzen van maritiem protest en draagt bij aan het bredere debat over de legitimiteit en regulering van diepzeemijnbouwactiviteiten.

Together with its mineral resources, ‘the Area’ – comprising the seabed and subsoil beyond the boundaries of national jurisdiction – is designated as the ‘common heritage of mankind’. One of the predominant motivations behind the principle of the common heritage of mankind was to ensure fair sharing of the benefits derived from the Area by preventing a first-come first-serve race to the bottom of the ocean, which would mainly entitle developed nations – possessing the necessary expertise, technology and financial means to engage in deep sea mining – to the mineral resources of the deep seabed and would exclude most developing States from these economic opportunities. This important objective ought to be effected through a number of measures, but most of these measures have not yet been implemented by the International Seabed Authority or seem to be undermined by current developments.

In a previous publication in IJMCL, the author discussed a case of interference by envi-ronmental activists with the operations of a deep sea mining contractor in May 2021. While concluding that the actions could be considered unlawful, one of the most important findings was that adequate enforcement and effective remedies are mostly lacking. In November 2023, protest actions by Greenpeace from a Dutch-flagged vessel against deep sea mining activities resulted in media attention and a response by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), and led to a decision by an Amsterdam district court. This article examines the legal issues arising from both the ISA response and the Dutch court decision.

Over the last couple of decades, the link between human rights and a healthy environment has been increasingly recognized. Although in most international human rights instruments there is no standalone human right to a healthy environment, the right has been indirectly acknowledged and confirmed before regional human rights courts or national courts. The recognition has so far predominantly related to issues of pollution that could clearly impact human health.1 More recently there have been (national) court cases that link human rights to climate change, like the Urgenda cases in the Netherlands and the case brought by Milieudefensie against Shell. 2 This chapter will examine an area of international law where the link between the human right to a healthy environment and environmental degradation seems less obvious, namely the link between biodiversity loss and human health. In recent years, we have seen a steady increase in attention to this link, both in science and in law. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the attention given to the link between biodiversity loss and its impact on human health.3 The core question in this chapter is to what extent an enforceable human right to a biodiverse environment is recognized in international law and how the link between biodiversity and the right to a healthy environment can be strengthened. First, this chapter will give a brief description of the link between biodiversity and human health. Next, the current situation in international legal documents will be examined, both in international human rights law, and in international environmental law. Finally, some suggestions as to the lege ferenda on the human right to a biodiverse environment will be made.

In mei 2021 werden de werkzaamheden van een Belgisch diepzeemijnbouwbedrijf (Global Sea Mineral Resources) reeds verstoord door milieuactivisten. Hoewel de acties als illegaal konden worden beschouwd, bleek toen vooral dat doeltreffende handhaving en effectieve rechtsmiddelen grotendeels ontbreken. Tweeënhalf jaar later wordt een gelijkaardige zaak het voorwerp van meer media-aandacht, toegenomen betrokkenheid van de Internationale Zeebodemautoriteit en een Nederlandse rechtszaak. In het licht van deze nieuwe ontwikkelingen en op basis van een analyse van pertinente regelgeving en rechtspraak, worden de feiten van deze recente zaak, de uitgevaardigde maatregelen en de rechterlijke beslissing kritisch geëvalueerd. Er wordt bovendien gepoogd om de potentiële impact van deze casus in te schatten en na te gaan hoe protestactiviteiten tegen diepzeemijnbouw op zee in de toekomst zullen worden benaderd.

Op 2 mei 2024 werd een nieuw wetsontwerp inzake diepzeemijnbouw goedgekeurd door de plenaire vergadering van de Kamer van het Belgische federale parlement. De wet komt er aan tijdens een sleutelperiode voor de diepzeemijnbouwindustrie, die enerzijds versneld op de exploitatiefase lijkt af te stevenen door de controversiële inroeping van een ambigue verdragsregel, en anderzijds op de helling staat door de aan belang winnende oproepen tot een moratorium op dergelijke activiteiten. De aanleiding voor het ontwikkelen van een nieuwe diepzeemijnbouwwet hoeft niet ver gezocht te worden: grootschalige commerciële ontginning van diepzeemineralen zou in de nabije toekomst van start kunnen gaan en België fungeert als sponsorstaat voor een bedrijf dat als één van de frontrunners in de industrie kan worden gezien. De voorgaande wetgeving dateerde van 2013 en de Belgische overheid achtte het noodzakelijk om een sterker regelgevend kader vast te leggen, met bijkomende garanties voor het mariene milieu en de sponsorstaat. In dit artikel wordt de nieuwe wet gekaderd en geanalyseerd om uiteindelijk te beoordelen in welke mate deze verbeteringen aanbrengt ten aanzien van haar voorganger.

A State’s position on international law is “determined by the basic principles of its foreign policy.” Soviet international law scholar Gregorii Tunkin’s statement seems as valid as ever today. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine since 2014, the horrors of Bucha and Russia’s increasingly questionable statements leave little room for imagination that it is a nation that cares little for international law as Western nations see it. While Russia’s approach to international law has received increasing attention in recent years, not all fields of international law have been explored in equal depth. This article intends to put the spotlight on Russia’s evolving approach to one of the bedrock principles of the international law of the sea, the freedom of navigation and its corollary, the right of innocent passage, specifically for warships and government vessels. It will become clear that, rather than following in its footsteps, Russia is in many ways backtracking on the more liberal views developed by the Soviet-Union in its final years and is en route to embracing some modern form of closed seas doctrine.

Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in areas beyond national jurisdiction exist yet are currently few and far between. Despite the lukewarm approach to such MPAs, the cobwebs have been dusted off by the Convention for the Protection of Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (‘the BBNJ Treaty’) as it presents MPAs as a key tool in the protection of biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. This article reviews the issues which lie behind the limited success of current MPAs in areas beyond national jurisdiction, before contemplating whether the BBNJ Treaty is capable of remedying these issues and whether it can carve out a place for MPAs in areas beyond national jurisdiction among the more traditional uses of the seas found in the high seas freedoms.