Research & publications 2026

This article examines the international legal framework governing electromagnetic warfare in situations of armed conflict. It first considers whether and to what extent international telecommunications law continues to apply between belligerents in wartime, before turning to international humanitarian law. The article then analyses how the rules of international humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities apply to electromagnetic warfare, with a particular focus on the jamming of enemy communication systems and the jamming and spoofing of Global Navigation Satellite Systems that guide enemy weapon systems. It clarifies when such operations qualify as ‘attacks’ within the meaning of Article 49(1) of the 1977 First Additional Protocol and assesses how the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack operate in this context, thereby highlighting the specific legal challenges posed by such operations. The article further examines the constraints applicable to electromagnetic operations that fall below the attack threshold, including the obligation of constant care and the special protection afforded to medical services.

In its Advisory Opinion on the Request submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) concluded that, under Article 192 of the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), States must take all necessary measures to protect and preserve the marine environment from the impacts of climate change. Acknowledging the disruptive effects of climate change on fish stocks, the Tribunal concluded that Article 192 gives rise to additional obligations under international fisheries law. In particular, States must take climate change impacts into account when conserving and managing fish stocks pursuant to Articles 61, 63, 64, and 117–119 of UNCLOS. This article analyzes ITLOS’ interpretation of these provisions. It then explores their practical implications and applications, given the Tribunal’s limited guidance. Finally, it argues that certain obligations concerning climate-driven stock redistribution remain insufficiently clarified.

This timely book examines the European Green Deal in relation to the rule of law, providing insights into the potential and limitations of the EU’s legal powers in achieving the Green Deal’s objectives. It explores key themes including constitutional questions, market steering, enforcement, liability and access to justice, and the EU’s global influence. It includes contributions from UGent professors An Cliquet and Hendrik Schoukens:

• Chapter 2. The bumpy landing of the EU Nature Restoration Law and the rule of law: process and substance (An Cliquet, Federica Cittadino, and Sonja Gantioler),
• Chapter 9: The EU Green Deal, EIA and global warming: balancing the rule of law with the quest for climate neutrality (Hendrik Schoukens).

In this article (in Dutch) Frederik Rogiers (PhD researcher GRILI & Maritime Institute) takes operation Blue Intruder - the boarding of the tanker Ethera off the coast of Zeebrugge on 1 March 2026 - as a starting point to explain what the so-called Russian shadow fleet is: a loose network of roughly 1,500 ageing tankers operating outside the regular maritime circuit in order to circumvent Western sanctions. He sets out the ecological and security risks that these poorly maintained and barely insured vessels pose to a densely used North Sea, and examines why intervention long proved difficult under international law of the sea, where the principle of flag-state jurisdiction shields such ships from outside control. The piece discusses how Articles 92(2) and 110 UNCLOS - recently reinforced by a joint declaration of fourteen North Sea and Baltic states treating ships sailing under multiple flags as stateless - open the door to boarding without the consent of a clear flag state, and highlights the gaps that remain in Belgian law, which still has no specific offence for sailing without a valid flag. Frederik concludes that the Ethera was a valuable test case, but that a clearer national framework is needed before the next shadow-fleet tanker enters Belgium's exclusive economic zone.

Frederik Rogiers, PhD researcher and teaching assistant at the Ghent Rolin-Jaequemyns International Law Institute (GRILI), has published a new blog post on Opinio Juris. The post - "A Blockade by the Book: Why CENTCOM's Carve-Out for Non-Iranian Ports Matters" - examines the United States' naval blockade of Iran declared in April 2026. It argues that the geographical carve-out preserving access to non-Iranian ports, introduced by CENTCOM within a day of President Trump's announcement of a "blockade of the Strait of Hormuz", is the legal cornerstone on which the lawfulness of the entire operation rests. Working through the conditions for a lawful blockade as developed from the 1856 Paris Declaration through the San Remo and Newport Manuals, he shows how that single textual choice distinguishes a lawful belligerent closure of enemy ports from an unlawful closure of a neutral international strait.

On 30 April 2026, Israeli naval forces boarded the Global Sumud Flotilla near Crete, roughly 600 nautical miles from Gaza. A second wave was intercepted off Cyprus weeks later. Both operations were defended as enforcement of Israel's 2009 naval blockade of Gaza. The analysis turns on three questions. Can a State blockade territory it occupies, in light of the ICJ's 2024 and 2025 advisory opinions? Does this blockade still meet its humanitarian conditions, given the 2025 famine confirmation, UNRWA's expulsion and the ICC's starvation warrants? And, most strikingly, is there any precedent for enforcing a blockade hundreds of nautical miles from the blockaded coast? Drawing on the available sources of international law, including the San Remo Manual, the Newport Manual and eight decades of state practice, the post shows that while the former question poses no issue, the humanitarian limits of the blockade have since been crossed while every blockade since 1945 has remained at least somewhat tethered to the blockaded coast. Enforcement at several hundred nautical miles, Frederik Rogiers argues, resembles a quasi-global visit-and-search regime more than a blockade, with real implications for freedom of navigation and the law governing operations at sea.

Upon invitation of the Commission for foreign affairs of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives,  colleagues of the University of Ghent and Utrecht University drafted a short advice (in Dutch) on the pending legislative proposal to introduce a Belgian ('Magnitsky-style') sanctions regime for serious human rights violations (Doc 56 1283/001). While welcoming the initiative as a useful complement to the extant European Union Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EUGHRSR), the advice identifies various issues requiring special attention, including the interaction with EUGHRS regime, the scope of the legislative proposal, or the need for carve-outs and procedural guarantees.