Publications

A State’s position on international law is “determined by the basic principles of its foreign policy.” Soviet international law scholar Gregorii Tunkin’s statement seems as valid as ever today. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine since 2014, the horrors of Bucha and Russia’s increasingly questionable statements leave little room for imagination that it is a nation that cares little for international law as Western nations see it. While Russia’s approach to international law has received increasing attention in recent years, not all fields of international law have been explored in equal depth. This article intends to put the spotlight on Russia’s evolving approach to one of the bedrock principles of the international law of the sea, the freedom of navigation and its corollary, the right of innocent passage, specifically for warships and government vessels. It will become clear that, rather than following in its footsteps, Russia is in many ways backtracking on the more liberal views developed by the Soviet-Union in its final years and is en route to embracing some modern form of closed seas doctrine.

Op 2 mei 2024 werd een nieuw wetsontwerp inzake diepzeemijnbouw goedgekeurd door de plenaire vergadering van de Kamer van het Belgische federale parlement. De wet komt er aan tijdens een sleutelperiode voor de diepzeemijnbouwindustrie, die enerzijds versneld op de exploitatiefase lijkt af te stevenen door de controversiële inroeping van een ambigue verdragsregel, en anderzijds op de helling staat door de aan belang winnende oproepen tot een moratorium op dergelijke activiteiten. De aanleiding voor het ontwikkelen van een nieuwe diepzeemijnbouwwet hoeft niet ver gezocht te worden: grootschalige commerciële ontginning van diepzeemineralen zou in de nabije toekomst van start kunnen gaan en België fungeert als sponsorstaat voor een bedrijf dat als één van de frontrunners in de industrie kan worden gezien. De voorgaande wetgeving dateerde van 2013 en de Belgische overheid achtte het noodzakelijk om een sterker regelgevend kader vast te leggen, met bijkomende garanties voor het mariene milieu en de sponsorstaat. In dit artikel wordt de nieuwe wet gekaderd en geanalyseerd om uiteindelijk te beoordelen in welke mate deze verbeteringen aanbrengt ten aanzien van haar voorganger.

In mei 2021 werden de werkzaamheden van een Belgisch diepzeemijnbouwbedrijf (Global Sea Mineral Resources) reeds verstoord door milieuactivisten. Hoewel de acties als illegaal konden worden beschouwd, bleek toen vooral dat doeltreffende handhaving en effectieve rechtsmiddelen grotendeels ontbreken. Tweeënhalf jaar later wordt een gelijkaardige zaak het voorwerp van meer media-aandacht, toegenomen betrokkenheid van de Internationale Zeebodemautoriteit en een Nederlandse rechtszaak. In het licht van deze nieuwe ontwikkelingen en op basis van een analyse van pertinente regelgeving en rechtspraak, worden de feiten van deze recente zaak, de uitgevaardigde maatregelen en de rechterlijke beslissing kritisch geëvalueerd. Er wordt bovendien gepoogd om de potentiële impact van deze casus in te schatten en na te gaan hoe protestactiviteiten tegen diepzeemijnbouw op zee in de toekomst zullen worden benaderd.

In March 2021, the six-day blockage of the Suez Canal, caused by the grounding of Evergreen's 'Ever Given' containership, created chaos in global trade. The 400-m giant lodged horizontally in a 265-m wide stretch of the canal and the efforts to dislodge and refloat it were unprecedented, involving dredging, towing and lightering. The accident marked one of the most severe disruptions at a key chokepoint in the international shipping network. Using ship voyage data, this research introduces a model to quantify the economic losses of a carrier's containership fleet, caused by such a disruption. The studied impacts include ship costs, environmental costs, and inventory-carrying costs. The model is applied to Maersk Line's East-West network, with 69 vessels (0.84m TEUs) affected by the blockage, either by having to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope or by the delays caused during and after the blockage. The results point to an additional 44,574 tonnes of CO2 produced by the extended trips and extra waiting times of the Maersk ships. The total losses incurred amount to $88.79m, comprising ship costs of $8.04m, environmental costs of $4.46m and, most strikingly of all, inventory-carrying costs of $76.29m, stemming from the high value of goods onboard ($26.5bn). Ship deviations also resulted in revenue losses for the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) of $5.86m, from Maersk crossings alone. Additionally, the research findings shed light on the vulnerabilities of maritime supply chains, particularly concerning prolonged roundtrips, changes to port call patterns, and extended cargo delivery times.

(2024) The right to a healthy environment in and beyond the Anthropocene: a European perspective. p.72-92

Over the last couple of decades, the link between human rights and a healthy environment has been increasingly recognized. Although in most international human rights instruments there is no standalone human right to a healthy environment, the right has been indirectly acknowledged and confirmed before regional human rights courts or national courts. The recognition has so far predominantly related to issues of pollution that could clearly impact human health.1 More recently there have been (national) court cases that link human rights to climate change, like the Urgenda cases in the Netherlands and the case brought by Milieudefensie against Shell. 2 This chapter will examine an area of international law where the link between the human right to a healthy environment and environmental degradation seems less obvious, namely the link between biodiversity loss and human health. In recent years, we have seen a steady increase in attention to this link, both in science and in law. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the attention given to the link between biodiversity loss and its impact on human health.3 The core question in this chapter is to what extent an enforceable human right to a biodiverse environment is recognized in international law and how the link between biodiversity and the right to a healthy environment can be strengthened. First, this chapter will give a brief description of the link between biodiversity and human health. Next, the current situation in international legal documents will be examined, both in international human rights law, and in international environmental law. Finally, some suggestions as to the lege ferenda on the human right to a biodiverse environment will be made.

This study examines how container shipping companies Maersk and MSC as B2B service providers effectively manage influencer marketing and implement managerial influencer marketing strategies within their industry. After the elaboration of a conceptual framework on constructs and protocols for effective influencer marketing, the Interval Type 2 Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchical Process (IT2F-AHP) method is used in combination with structured interviews to identify crucial attributes for successfully managing influencer marketing strategy in a B2B context. The findings underscore a notable emphasis placed by container shipping companies on internal influencers sourced from their workforce, as opposed to external influencers from the global market. This signifies a strategic orientation toward managing interaction-based marketing strategies. Additionally, when applying the 4M Model to the essential protocols for influencer marketing (i.e., make, manage, monitor, and measure), we observed a preference for the “manage” protocol and a lesser emphasis on measurement tools for assessing influencer marketing success. Despite the importance of corporate user accounts in social media, Maersk and MSC generally do not prioritize a protocol “measure” through these channels. We also found that trust is the highest weighted criterion in managing influencer marketing. In conclusion, this research sheds light on the nuanced strategies employed by liner shipping companies in leveraging influencer marketing strategy and engagement in a B2B context. These insights offer managers practical guidance and benchmarking opportunities to navigate the complexities of influencer marketing and optimize influencer marketing strategies and engagement in B2B markets.

E. Ciravegna, L. van Hoof, C. Frier, Frank Maes (UGent) , H.B. Rasmussen, Anemoon Soete (UGent) and S.W.K. van den Burg (2024) MARINE POLICY. 161.

As ocean space increasingly is used for production purposes, such as for the production of food and feed, renewable energy and resource mining, competition for space becomes a concern. A spatial solution to this is to co -locate activities in a multi -use setting. Next to the direct (financial) costs and benefits of multi -use and the societal cost and benefits, there are other factors, in the realm of legal aspects, insurance, health and safety issues and the overall governance of multi -use, that determine whether multi -use can be implemented successfully. This includes transaction costs that arise when for example non -adequate regulation, governance and insurance schemes are in place. Based on the analysis of five case studies across Europe these combined/collective transaction costs of multi -use are analysed and suggestions how to reduce and/or overcome these transaction costs are presented.

In a previous publication in IJMCL, the author discussed a case of interference by envi-ronmental activists with the operations of a deep sea mining contractor in May 2021. While concluding that the actions could be considered unlawful, one of the most important findings was that adequate enforcement and effective remedies are mostly lacking. In November 2023, protest actions by Greenpeace from a Dutch-flagged vessel against deep sea mining activities resulted in media attention and a response by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), and led to a decision by an Amsterdam district court. This article examines the legal issues arising from both the ISA response and the Dutch court decision.

Ward Van Roy, Jean-Baptiste Merveille, Annelore Van Nieuwenhove, Kobe Scheldeman and Frank Maes (UGent) (2024) MARINE POLICY. 159.

Since 2015, Belgium has undertaken remote measurement activities to monitor SO2 and NOx emissions from ships to single out ships for on-board inspections in ports. One of the main challenges in enhancing the enforcement capabilities revolves around using these remote measurements as legal evidence. Previous studies have demonstrated that when an appropriate measurement uncertainty is taken into account, remote measurements can provide scientifically reliable evidence to verify compliance to fuel sulphur standards (FSC) and even to NOx emission limits described by MARPOL Annex VI. Nonetheless, remote SO2 and NOx measurements have so far not been used for direct legal action. In the first section of this article, the potential use of these remote measurements as legal evidence within international and national legal instruments is examined. Furthermore, while there are guidelines to enforce compliance with FSC standards in port, there are currently no recognized methods to enforce real-world NOx emissions at sea. In this context, standardized remote measurement procedures could potentially become a valuable tool in combination with specific vessel data (keel laying year, engine rated speed, power, …), in establishing an enforcement mechanism for NOx. This would require specific changes to the current NOx regulations. Within the Bonn Agreement, the MARPOL Annex VI Working Groups identified certain regulatory gaps that need to be addressed in order to effectively reduce emissions from ships and improve enforcement capacity. In the second part of this article a critical analysis of these recommendations and the results of these discussions towards new regulations is presented.

(2024) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW. 39(3).

Together with its mineral resources, ‘the Area’ – comprising the seabed and subsoil beyond the boundaries of national jurisdiction – is designated as the ‘common heritage of mankind’. One of the predominant motivations behind the principle of the common heritage of mankind was to ensure fair sharing of the benefits derived from the Area by preventing a first-come first-serve race to the bottom of the ocean, which would mainly entitle developed nations – possessing the necessary expertise, technology and financial means to engage in deep sea mining – to the mineral resources of the deep seabed and would exclude most developing States from these economic opportunities. This important objective ought to be effected through a number of measures, but most of these measures have not yet been implemented by the International Seabed Authority or seem to be undermined by current developments.

This study identifies and analyzes the relative importance of the multi-faceted factors that drive the decision to automate container terminals and the realized benefits, thus establishing how accurately terminal operators predicted the benefits of automation. The empirical analysis relies on a survey-based approach and the input of senior representatives of terminal operating entities in charge of the fully and semi-automated container terminals. The analysis of the findings, using statistical tools (i.e., descriptive statistics, Pearson correlations, ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis), reveals that most of the benefits assumed by an individual terminal operator materialized once the automated terminal was in operation. It also concludes that expectations often exceed benefits and vice versa. A stepwise regression analysis enables the search of causal relationships between drivers and realized benefits with key characteristics of automated container terminals, such as their organizational features, technical dimensions, and the maritime and urban markets they serve.

This contribution deals with alliance formation in container shipping. We examine the emergence and growth of these alliances, the dynamics in alliance composition and the drivers behind alliance membership. We also zoom in on how regulatory authorities have dealt and are still dealing with alliances. We argue that the current regulatory scrutiny could jeopardize the continuation of alliances as we know it. Still, we argue that there is a sort of excessive attention to regulation as a possible threat to alliance continuation, while market-based barriers to alliance membership are somewhat ignored. Therefore, we elaborate on possible market-based aspects that could make alliance membership less interesting from a carrier’s perspective.

Diepzeemijnbouw vormt een groeiend juridisch en ecologisch spanningsveld binnen het internationaal zeerecht. Terwijl industriële actoren deze praktijk promoten als een noodzakelijke bron van kritieke metalen voor de mondiale energietransitie, waarschuwen milieuorganisaties voor de onvoorspelbare en potentieel onomkeerbare schade aan het mariene ecosysteem. In afwezigheid van een bindend moratorium, nemen protestacties op zee toe, waaronder de interventie van Greenpeace tegen het Belgische bedrijf Global Sea Mineral Resources (GSR) in de Stille Oceaan in 2021. Deze acties, waarbij fysieke verstoring van mijnbouwtests plaatsvond, roepen fundamentele juridische vragen op over de reikwijdte van het recht op vreedzaam protest op volle zee, de verhouding tot de maritieme vrijheden, en de rol van de Internationale Zeebodemautoriteit (ISA) als regulerende instantie.

Dit artikel onderzoekt de juridische toelaatbaarheid van dergelijke protestvormen aan de hand van verdragsrechtelijke bepalingen, ISA-regelgeving en relevante nationale wetgeving. Daarbij wordt geanalyseerd in hoeverre activisme op zee verenigbaar is met het internationaal recht, welke handhavingsmechanismen beschikbaar zijn bij potentiële inbreuken, en wie bevoegd is om deze te activeren. De studie biedt een genuanceerd inzicht in de juridische grenzen van maritiem protest en draagt bij aan het bredere debat over de legitimiteit en regulering van diepzeemijnbouwactiviteiten.

103 INT’L L. STUD. 230 (2024)

As of today, the framework of ocean governance of coastal maritime areas created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is well understood and accepted by the international community. However, there are large and important areas of ocean space around the world that are subject to a more nuanced framework of interrelated norms. These are maritime areas that have come under the effective control of occupying States, often through the use of force. As such, the legal framework applicable to these maritime areas is that of the law of occupation.

Nevertheless, because of the specificities of the zonal maritime regimes established under UNCLOS, the application of the law of occupation is seldom as straightforward at sea as it is on land. The objective of this article is therefore to shed some light on the application of the law of occupation at sea, and in doing so arrive at a comprehensive analysis of the rights and duties of occupying States in maritime areas.

(2024) NIEUW JURIDISCH WEEKBLAD. p.369-374

De auteur onderzoekt in welke mate de werkpunten en lacunes met betrekking tot transparantie, publieke participatie en toegang tot de rechter binnen de context van diepzeemijnbouw in de voorbije vier jaar aangepakt zijn. Hiermee blikt de auteur terug op zijn eerdere bijdrage die hij schreef met Hendrik Schoukens: “Procedurele milieurechten en diepzeemijnbouw. Terra incognita?”, in NjW verschenen op 15 januari 2020 in aflevering 414.

The decarbonization of the shipping industry is a critical imperative in the global fight against climate change. Non-EU countries, being significant contributors to shipping emissions, play a crucial role in shaping the industry's sustainable future. However, securing funding for shipping decarbonization initiatives in these countries presents challenges, such as limited access to capital, lack of financial initiatives, political and regulatory uncertainties, technological risks, lack of local expertise, and the effects of global economic volatility. Addressing these challenges demands innovative strategies. The paper explores ways of effectively allocating funds for decarbonization projects in the shipping industry of non-EU countries, Türkiye in particular, using a structured decision-making framework tailored to their specific needs and challenges. We adopt the Moment Integrated Solution Method (THEMIS) to identify the “best” option from the range of alternative strategies identified in the framework. Our findings show that the use of incentive mechanisms is the most prioritized funding alternative, followed by the implementation of a sound Cap-and-Trade system and the promotion of strict local regulations to combat emissions. These imply that the prioritization of funding mechanisms, market-driven approaches, and more stringent regulation are key drivers in maritime decarbonization efforts. The Türkiye case study on strategies to achieve a greener maritime industry in developing countries also shows that securing funding for decarbonization requires a concerted effort by governments, private entities, and international organizations.

IAPH World Ports Tracker, EDITION 6 (Quarter 4, 2023)

(2024) OCEAN ENGINEERING. 300.

The shipping industry must delineate feasible switching pathways of emission reduction technologies for vessels if it wants to meet the emission reduction targets set forth by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). This paper introduces a programming model integrating power systems, alternative fuels, and air emission control measures to decarbonize bulk vessel operations. The model captures the uncertainty in fuel prices and carbon emission prices. Reliable decision-making schemes are generated using interval quadratic programming. The results reveal that power systems will switch from mono-fuel internal combustion engines (MF ICE) to dual-fuel internal combustion engines (DF ICE). Traditional fossil fuels will progressively give way to carbon-neutral alternatives. The combination of air emission control measures will markedly reduce emissions.

(2024) In UNCTAD Transport and Trade Facilitation Newsletter

Measuring trends in maritime markets is a dynamic process, as markets change over time. Regarding liner shipping trends, UNCTAD revised its well-established Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) in mid-March 2024, adjusting the impact of vessel size on the final index measurements.

(2024) TIJDSCHRIFT VERVOER & RECHT. p.3-12

Naast heel wat opportuniteiten, brengt het nieuwe Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ)-verdrag ook verschillende vragen met zich mee. De ambities zijn weliswaar duidelijk, maar hoe deze precies verwezenlijkt zullen worden en welke impact dit zal hebben op allerhande activiteiten op volle zee is vooralsnog minder helder. De component van het BBNJ-verdrag die in principe de grootste invloed op de scheepvaart teweeg zou moeten brengen, betreft de creatie van gebiedsgerichte beheersinstrumenten en – meer specifiek – mariene beschermde gebieden. Met het VN-Zeerechtverdrag als hoeksteen en diverse internationaalrechtelijke concepten ter verdere uitwerking ervan, kan het BBNJ-verdrag op een aantal instrumenten voortbouwen, maar de huidige praktijk met betrekking tot Special Areas en Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA’s) toont aan dat de vrijheid van scheepvaart tot dusver de overhand heeft. Het BBNJ-verdrag faciliteert weliswaar de oprichting van mariene beschermde gebieden op volle zee en creëert een nieuw elan, maar aangezien de Internationale Maritieme Organisatie thans slechts zeer uitzonderlijk beperkingen oplegt aan het scheepvaartverkeer, lijkt een ingrijpende cultuuromslag in de nabije toekomst eerder onwaarschijnlijk. Indien er toch een dergelijke doorbraak komt, is het aangewezen om de potentiële gevolgen op het vlak van scheepvaartemissies in toenemende mate te betrekken bij het overleg omtrent mariene beschermde gebieden, zodat kortzichtige beslissingen – die de bredere context uit het oog verliezen – vermeden worden.

(2024) MARITIME ECONOMICS & LOGISTICS. 26(1). p.1-20

The attack of Hamas on Israel of October 7, 2023, and the military response of the latter in Gaza have made news headlines for much of the last quarter of 2023 and  early 2024. The international community has attempted to prevent escalation and the spreading of the conflict to other parts of the Middle East and the wider world.

Despite those efforts, a major security situation emerged in mid-November in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab more specifically (map in Fig. 1), when  Houthi Rebels based in Yemen started to target international shipping transiting through the region. In a matter of weeks, the situation escalated, adversely affecting both shipping and trade.

Marine Policy

With the oceans covering 70% of the world’s surface, one might be under the illusion that every State might find sufficient space for their activities, nothing could be further from the truth. This was proven once more in January 2022 and August 2023 when Russian vessels sought to engage in military exercises within strategic areas of the Irish and Norwegian exclusive economic zones (EEZs), choosing some of the local fishermen’s preferred locations in the process. Unlike their governments, the local fishermen refused to accept the Russian intrusions and via continuous protest through presence succeeded in forcing the Russian Navy to move the exercises to another area. This example is proof that to this day, the legal framework of the EEZ still gives rise to significant questions and uncertainties, often to the benefit of lawfare lawyers, especially in regards to foreign military activities and overlapping uses of the same area. Art. 56 LOSC awards sovereign resource rights to the coastal State, but arts. 58 and 87 LOSC grant the maritime user State the freedom to navigate. How to reconcile these different uses has for a long time occupied the minds of law of the sea lawyers. In this article, an attempt is made - utilizing a selection of national and international jurisprudence - to clarify the relation between these different uses of the EEZ, their permissibility and why the fishermen’s success in these cases might not so easily be translated into general international law.

(2024) L’intelligence portuaire : opération - innovation – projection. In Collection Les Océanides 8. p.9-12